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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEVAR C. PACK and 
CAROLYN PACK, 
) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
) Case No. 18,136 
vs. 
) 
H U L L 0 E V E L 0 P M E ~l i C 0 . , I N C . , 
a Utah cor~oration, ) 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRI~F OF AP 0 ELLANT 
ST ATE~~ ENT 0 F i :~ E ~.i .4 TUR E 
0 F T H E 1: ,-1. S E 
The Appel 1 ant, Hul 1 Development Co., Inc., a Utah 
Corporation, appeals from denial of its Motions: ~or a new 
trial, to amend the findings of fact and conclus~c~s J; .., , 3 'N 
to amend the judgment. 
DISPOSITON IN LOWER COURT 
This matter came on for trial in the Fourth ~uaicia: 
District Court, the Honorable George E. Ballif presiding, on May 
28, 1981. The Attorneys for both oarties stipulated to all 
evidence and issues, except for the issue of damages for slander 
of title, which was testified to by Mr. Hull. All other items 
~" e r e s u b m i t t e d b y b r i e f . ( E x . 1 ; T r . P . 2 - 5 ) .~ 1 I ~ x ~ i b ~ t s f o r 
the Plaintiff and Defendant were submitted as joint exhibits fo~ 
both parties. (Tr. p. 3) On the 10th day of July, 1981, the 
Court entered judgment for the Plaintiff-Respondent. On July 
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20, 1981, the Defendant-Respondent filed with the Court motions: 
for a new trial, to amend the judgment and to amend the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The motions were submitted on 
brief and on October 29, 1981, the Court denied each of the 
motions pending. On Friday, November 27, 1981, a Notice of 
Appeal was filed, which notice was docketed on Monday, November 
30, 1981. It should be noted that no testimony or oral argument 
was presented before Judge Ballif on any of the issues appealed 
in this matter. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the District Court's 
judgment, a new trial, or amendment of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of the Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A careful examination of the facts 1n this matter will 
clearly show that there was no waiver of contract payments at 
the time of forfeiture. They establish that proper notice to 
cure and reasonable time to cure were given. They also 
establish that the Court made material errors of law and fact 
which require reversal of the judgment rendered in the lower 
court. 
On August 27, 1977, the Packs, Plaintiff-Respondent, 
submi:ted an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to ?urc~ase for a 
lot owned by Hull Development Co., Defendant-Appellant. The 
earnest Money Offer was signed by all parties and it specified 
ali necessary terms for the sale. (Ex. 25) 
-2-
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The Earnest Money Offer called for six payments of 
$500.00 per month and then monthly payments of $250.00 per month 
until paid in full. This was then orally modified in several 
respects, which changes were reflected in correspondence dated 
December 9, 1977, and February 27, 1978. (Ex. 12, 20) As shown 
in the correspondence, there was a minor dispute over a sewer 
connection, (Ex. 17 and 18), and the Packs refused to execute a 
uniform real estate contract form sent them jy ~u11, (Ex. 16), 
but they made sporadic oayments over the next 2~ years. 
Correspondence submitted into evidence s~ow tnat 
notice of delinquent payments and urgings to bring oayments 
current were sent by Hull as follows: 
December 9, 1977 -- (Ex. 12) 
February 27, 1978 -- (Ex. 20) 
May 16, 1978 -- (Ex. 21) 
December 16, 1978 -- (Ex. 8) 
February 28, 1979 -- (Ex. 11) 
April 16, 197? -- (Ex. 131 
October 23, 1979 -- (Ex. <l) 
Items submitted into evidence, (Ex. 3) and the record 
p. 44-46 show the following payments: 
April 18, 1977 
July ld, 1977 
Sept. 20, 1977 
Nov. 18, 1977 
Feb. 7, 1978 
Apr. 15, 1978 
July 12, 1978 
July 12, 1978 
Dec. 4, 1978 
Dec. 17, 1978 
Mar. 20, 1979 
Apr. 26, 1979 
May 28, 1979 
-3-
$ 100.00 
2,000.00 cash 
516.25 
608. 75 
500.00 
500.00 
500.00 
30.00 Taxes 
500.00 
129.56 Taxes? 
2,142.00 
250.00 
250.00 
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June 25, 1979 
Sept. 24, 1979 
(This check returned-
uncashed 10-23-79) 
1otal 
250.00 
250.00 
$8,527.06 
The parties stipulated to payments in the amount of 58,617.00. 
In addition there were many phone calls from Hull to 
the Packs concerning the account. More specifically the 
Affidavit of David Thomas, (R. 91-2), attached ~o Hull's 
motions, indicates telephone calls to the Packs as follows: 
August 31, 1979 
October l, 1979 
~otice of intent to 
terminate if def3u1~ 
not cured 
Termination of contract 
upon failure to cure 
It should be noted that after the letter giving notice 
of strict compliance, dated February 28, 1979, the Packs 
immediately paid $2142.00 and made ~ayments for three ~onths, 
then they missed two monthly payments. On August 31, 1979, they 
were given notice of strict compliance and were given one month 
(September) to bring payments current. No payments were ma~e in 
September and on October 1, 1979, a forfeiture was declared and 
the Packs were notified of such. A check dated September 24, 
1979, and sent to the wrong address was received on October 22, 
1979. This check in the amount of S250.00 was not enough to 
cure ~he default. Affidavit of David Thomas. (R.9~-2) On 
Oc~ober 23, 1979, written notice of forfeiture was sent to the 
Packs and the check of $250.00 received the day before was 
re~urned to them along with a check in the amount of SS,666.~2 
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which was a return of all principal paid by the Packs. No 
substantive contacts were made between the parties until August 
4, 1980, when Hull contacted the Packs by letter requesting them 
to remove notices of interest on the record for the lot as 
l 
another buyer wanted to purchase the lJt. (Ex. 2) The Packs 
brought this action on August 8, 1980, for specific oer•ormance 
of the earnest money offer, and Hull counterclaimed for slander 
of title. 
On July 10, 1981, the Court ru:ed in favor cf the 
Plaintiffs-Respondents and granted judgment 
performance. The Court found that Hull had waived stric~ 
compliance with the Earnest Money Offer; had not g~ven proper 
notice as required by the Uniform Real Estate Contract, was not 
entitled to interest on the balance of the Earnest ~Oney o+~er. 
(R. 32-83) On July 20, 1981, Defendant-Aopellant ~otioned ~he 
Court for a new trial ~ased on the above 2r~ors :~ ~3w a~d J~on 
the grounds that material facts were not before the Court, which 
facts would require a reversal of the judgment. ~ull also 
motioned on the grounds that the Court and the attorneys were 
confused as to both the facts and issues before the Court. On 
October 29, 1981, the Court denied all motions for relief 
brought by the Defendant. (R. 110) 
This appeal is brought on the grounds that the 
judgment in the District Court contained material errors of law, 
which require a reversal of that judgment, and also on the 
-5-
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ground that missing facts and confusion of all parties require a 
new trial in the furtherance of justice. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE DELINQUENCY IN PAYMENTS BY THE PLAINTIFF-
RESPONDENT WAS NOT WAIVED AT THE TIME DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
DECLARED FORFEITURE OF T~E CONTRACT. 
It is wel1 recognized that reoeated warnings abou: 
delinquency without their enforcement is indicative of a 
willingness to waive strict compliance with the terms of a 
contract, Pacific Develooment v. Stewart, et ux, 195 P.2d 7~8 
(Utah 1948). However, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a 
vendor has some latitude in working with a vendee in an attempt 
~Q allow him opportunity to cure without waiver of the payment 
schedule on a contract becoming permanent. See cors·'/th v. 
Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358 (Utah 1980) (waiver for a specified 
period.) W.P. Harlin Construction Comoany v. Utah State Road 
Commission, 431 P.2d 792 (Utah 1967) (waiver on one contract not 
applicable to another contract between same parties.) Christv 
et ux v. Guild et ux, 121 P.2d 401 (Utah 1942). (waiver of one 
payment not continuing waiver--terms specified in contract.) 
It is fJrther recognized that where, as 
several, or many, payments were late that a vendor could not 
demand strict compliance without first giving the buyer fair 
-6-
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warning to that effect. Paul v. Kitt, 544 P.2d 886 (Utah 1975); 
Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980). 
This court has determined that fair warning of strict 
compliance, sufficient to void any previous waiver, must be an 
affirmative act indicating what the default is and what must be 
done to cure the default. Hansen v. Christensen, 545 P.2d 1152 
(Utah 1976); Grow v. Marwick Oevelooment, Inc., 621 P.2d 1249 
(Utah 1980). The letter of Hull dated February 28, 1979 (Ex. 
18), met those requirements and that act was sufficient to cure 
all previous waivers by Hull. Beneficial Life Insurance Ccmpanv 
v. Dennett, 470 P.2d 406 (Utah 1970). After the notice of 
February 28th, a payment totaling $2,142.00 and three monthly 
payments of $250.00 each were made. However, after default on 
two more payments for the months of July and August, 1979, the 
Packs were again notified that all delinquencies mus~ be cured 
by September 30, 1979. This notice was given by 3 direct 
telephone call to Mrs. Pack by David Thomas on August 31, 1979. 
(R. 91-92) 
This affirmative act was sufficient to put the Packs 
on notice to cure or forfeit the contract. Notice requirements 
broadly applied throughout American Jurisdictions are summarized 
thus: 
11 While it has been said that notice required to 
reinstate the right of rescission or forfeiture after 
waiver must be definite and specific, such notice need 
not always be definite and specific, it being 
sufficient that it may be inferred from the conduct of 
the vendor and vendee in their dealings with each 
other that they understood that the right of 
rescission or forfeiture was to be restored. A vendee 
-7-
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who has acquired knowledge of the intent of the vendor 
to insist on strict performance, no matter in what 
form that knowledge comes, must within a reasonable 
time bring his payments up to date. The notice must 
contain a demand for payment of what is due and must 
give the information that the vendor will i~sist on 
prompt payment in the future." (Emphasis added). 
Corzus Juris Secundum, Vendor ·and Purchaser, Sect; on 
139 b), page 1083. 
The amount of time necessary to constitute a 
"reasonable time", has varied under rulings by this court. 
Lamont v. Eujen, 508 P.2d 523 (Utah 1973) (four days not enough 
time); Call v. Timber Lakes Corp., 567 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977) 
(ten days not enough time); Pacific Development C9....:._, Suora at 
748 (twenty-three days is a reasonable time); Beneficial Life, 
Supra p.408 (ten months is a reasonable time). It is evident 
from the above cited cases that this Court has taken the 
position that a short time (few days) is not a reasonable time, 
but a longer period, twenty-three days to up to ten months, may 
be a reasonable time depending on the circumstances. 
In this instant case, both the notice of February 28, 
1979, and the notice of August 31, 1979, were reasonable, and 
mo r e s p e c i f i c a 1 1 y t h e n o t i c e o f Au g u s t 3 1 w h i c h a 1 1 o ,,, e d o n e 
month, thirty (30) days to cure was within the guidelines 
established by this Court. In any event, the two notices were 
sufficient to put the Packs on notice that they must cure the 
delinquency and that no additional waivers would be given. 
When the notice of termination was given on October 1, 
1979, the Packs could not have been surprised. Apparently they 
were not duly concerned as the payment received on October 22, 
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was only in the amount of $250.00, not enough to cure the 
delinquency. The letter of termination dated October 23, 1979, 
as a follow-up to the October 1st termination was proper and 
timely and met all the legal requirements established by this 
court. There was no waiver of delinquency in effect at the time 
of termination and the termination was proper, timely and legal. 
The decision of the District Court should be reversed on this 
point 
It should also be noted that Hull returned all 
payments of principal to the Packs as required by this Court. 
Jacobsen v. Swan, 278 P.2d 294 (Utah 1954); Call, Sup~a, p. 
11 0 9 . 
PO'INT II 
THE COURT ERRED IM FINDING THAT THE LETTER OF OCTOBER 
23 WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE IT DID NOT PROVIDE NOTICE AS ~EQUIRED 
BY THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT. 
The Earnest Money Agreement and Offer to Purchase form 
executed by both parties, is a legally binding contract, not 
merely an agreement to agree. Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597 
(Utah 1962). In Utah the earnest money agreement is binding 
even if it stipulates that the parties will enter into a 
11 contract 11 in the future. Id at 600; 0. H. Overmeyer v. Brown, 
439 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1971 ). As with any other contrac~, the 
terms of the earnest money agreement must be set forth with 
sufficient specificity and clarity that it can be performed. 
Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 423 P.2d 491 (Utah 1967); also see 
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Davison v. Robbins, 517 P.2d 1026 (Utah 1973). The earnest 
money agreement in this case complies with these requirements. 
(Ex. 25) 
In this case the Earnest Money Agreement was the only 
binding agreement as the Uniform Real Estate Contract was not 
executed by the parties. This fact was not contested by either 
party and was alluded to in the Stipulation of May 28, 1981, 
(Ex. 1) in the Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories of 
February 2, 1981, and in the trial briefs of both parties. No 
evidence or facts were presented before the Court which could 
sustain the Courts ruling that the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
was binding on either party. It is, therefore, material error 
for the Court to find that the notice requirements in the 
default provisions of the Uniform Real Estate Contract were 
required of Hull. See Court decision dated June 25, 1981. 
(R. 82-83) 
The Statute of Frauds prohibits the court from 
validating the Uniform Real Estate Contract agreement which was 
not executed by the alleged parties thereto, when no parol 
evidence is presented to the Court. Utah Code Annotated 25-5-3; 
Coleman v. Dillman, 624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981); Zion Properties v. 
Holt, 538 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975) Holingren Brothers v. Ballard, 
534).2d 611 (Utah 1975). The notice given by Hull has met the 
requirements of this court as discussed in Point I above under 
the Earnest Money Agreement, and the decision of the District 
Court should be reversed on this point. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING INTEREST TO THE 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ON THE OUTSTANDING BALANCE OF THE CONTRACT. 
The District Court ruled that the balance due on the 
contract was $11 ,379.93 and decreed that upon payment of said 
sum the title to the disputed property was to be conveyed to the 
Packs. The sum of $11 ,379.97 does not include interest as 
required by the Earnest Money Contract. The motion to amend the 
Court's decision to include interest in the amount due was 
denied by the Honorable Judge Ballif. (R. 110) 
This Court has ruled as recently as 1979 that as a 
matter of law interest on amounts found to be due under 
contracts was to be paid. Lignell v. Bera, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 
1979); See also Utah Code Annotated 15-1-4; Dairy Distributors 
Inc. v. Local Union 967, 396 P.2d 47 (Utah 196d). 7he Gecision 
of the District Court should be reversed on this ooint. 
POINT IV 
WHEN MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT UNDERSTOOD AND OTHER 
MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT PRESENTED AT TRIAL, IN THE FURTHERANCE OF 
JUSTICE A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED UNDER RULE 60(b)(7) UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
In this case many errors of law and fact were made by 
both the Court and the attorneys. These errors cumulatively 
require the reversal of the lower Court's decision. Among these 
errors are the following: 
-11-
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ERRORS OF LAW 
1. The finding that a waiver existed, see Point I. 
2. The finding that notice under the Uniform Real 
Est ate Contra· - t was re qui red , See Po; n t I I . 
3. The refusal of the Court to grant interest, see 
Point III. 
4. The finding that notice given to Packs by Hull 
w a s , 
11 i n e ff e c t i v e i n t h a t i t d i d n o t p r o v i de a n y re a s on a b 1 e 
time to cure ... " R. 82-83) 
ERRORS OF FACT 
1. The finding that Hull refused to accept payments 
when no additional payments were tendered and no evidence 
was introduced on this point. (Tr. pp 2-5; Ex. 1. R. 3, 
4) 
2. The confusion over whether attorney fees were 
stipulated. (Tr p.4; R. 83-84, 85-87, 98-100) 
3. The fact that the Court did not consider the 
notice to cure given on August 31, 1979, Affidavit of David 
Thomas in record. (R. 82-83, 91-92) 
4. The fact that the Court did not consider the 
termination given on October 1, 1979. Affidavit of David 
. . 
Thomas in record. (R. 82-83, 91-92) 
In addition, the knowledge that material facts and 
evidence was not available to the Court, at the time of its 
decision came to the attention of the Court in Defendant-
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Appellant's Motions for a new trial. (R. 92-92) Although the 
Court denied the motion for a new trial under rule 60(b)(7), 
URCP, a new trial should have been granted because these facts 
were necessary for justice to be reached in this case. (R. 110) 
Rule 60 is designed to allow the Court great latitude 
in correcting errors, in the furtherance of justice. The Court 
can relieve parties from such inequities for various reasons. 
Rule 60(8), Utah Rules of Civil Procedur~. ~ule 60(b)(7) URC? 
a 11 ow s the court even more 1 at i tu de by a 1 1 o w:i n g re 1 i e f from 
j u d gm en t for 11 any other reason j us ti f y i n g re 1 i e f . II . . . In 
Egan v . Egan , th i s court s tat e d , 11 Further , the Supreme Court of 
this State has ruled erroneous assumptions may be grounds 7or 
entering a new order. 11 Egan V. Egan, 560 Po 2d, 706 (Utah 1977). 
In that case, the lower court granted a partial re1ief from 
judgment under Rule 60(b)(7). The present case is one in wh~ch 
Rule 60(b)(7) should have been used to prevent an inequity, 
which will result, if the matter is not reopened for further 
hearing. It is evident that many erroneous assumptions were 
made by the court because material facts were not before the 
Court. This resulted in legal and factual errors bein9 made to 
the detriment of Appellant. These errors of law and fact 
require that this case be reversed and a new trial granted in 
the furtherance of justice. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits its analysis of the 
points of law and equity herein stated. The material errors of 
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law and fact are of such magnitude that justice can only be 
served by ·a revers a 1 of this case. Wherefore, Appe 11 ant 
respectfully requests that the Court reverse the decision of the 
District Court and grant a new trial in this matter. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
ROBERT 0. LAM REAUX 
Attorney for Appellant 
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